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Exporting Ethnic Divisions? 
The Political Participation of Belgian Citizens Abroad 
 
 
The Belgian emigrants’ political participation in home country politics is an issue that 
has undergone several important developments since the end of the 1990s but has 
surprisingly been subject to very little research. In comparison, the topic of the 
political participation of foreigners living in Belgium has been very well documented 
through different works on the socio-political mobilization of emigrants (Martiniello, 
1992) the extension of franchise to non-citizens (Jacobs, 1999) and the development 
of ethnic of politics in certain areas of the country (Martiniello, 1998).  
 
How can we explain the discrepancy between the study of non-citizens’ political 
participation and that of Belgian citizens residing abroad? One hypothesis is that 
Belgians abroad have never occupied a central position in the Belgian political agenda 
for two main reasons. First, Belgian authorities have expressed very little interest in 
reaching out to their citizens abroad despite the fact that Belgium has one of the 
highest emigration rate in Europe according to Eurostat data (4.7/1000) and has over 
300,000 of its citizens currently residing abroad in a country that has barely more than 
10,000,000 inhabitants. The absence of interest is visible in the absence of formal 
mechanism of consultation between the emigrants and the federal authorities, the lack 
of financial support to the few existing emigrant associations, the delays in the 
adoption of the external voting and the dual nationality laws and the lack of proper 
instruments to register efficiently citizens abroad until 2002. Second, the Belgian 
emigrants themselves have manifested limited interest in organizing themselves along 
national lines as demonstrated by the limited number of Belgian emigrants’ 
associations. Also, the two main emigrant associations have traditionally focused their 
contacts with the home country authorities on requesting timidly legislative and 
administrative modifications to the benefits of citizens abroad in the field of taxation, 
social security, nationality law and access to voting rights. 
 
The absence of the issue of emigration from the Belgian political agenda combined 
with the limited engagement of this population with the home country thus stands for 
the absence of research on the topic. The lack of academic interest, in turn, has 
favoured the development of two major stereotypes in Belgium with respect to the 
political preferences of citizens residing abroad. One is that the Belgian population 
abroad would tend to be more favourable to right-wing parties than the average 
Belgian citizens. This stereotype has long explained why the Francophone liberal 
party (PRL later called MR) has been most active in supporting the enfranchisement 
of citizens abroad for legislative elections. The second stereotype, to which we will 
devote most of our attention in this article, supposes that Belgians abroad would be 
unaffected by the political tensions opposing Flemish and Francophone political 
parties in Belgium over the past decade. These tensions have since World War II led 
to several reforms of the unitary state until the 1993 reform instituted the federal 
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organization of the state that grants significant autonomy to the regions in different 
policy areas. After the 2010 elections, the tensions between Flemings and 
Francophones has reached with the former’s demand to further increase the autonomy 
of the regional entities facing the latter’s resistance to engage in a new state’s reform. 
This situation has prevented the formation of any government for a year and has 
forced the outgoing government to stay in power with limited power of initiative. 
 
Despite the fact that over the past forty years Belgian politics have been increasingly 
dominated by the ethnic tension between Flemings and Francophones, the stereotype 
that Belgians abroad would be unaffected by these developments has remained. The 
idea that the evolution towards greater regional autonomy defended by political 
parties (with more intensity in Flanders than in French-speaking Belgium) would not 
find echo among Belgians abroad is thus very prevalent and is still frequently 
propagated by the press. In this article, I however question this idea that the political 
opinions of Belgians abroad would be unaffected by the evolution of the ethnic 
conflict between Flemings and Francophones and argue instead that the evolution of 
the ethnic conflict has led to the parallel division of the Belgian political opinion 
abroad. Belgian emigrants are not more supportive of the Belgian unitary state model 
than Belgian citizens residing in Belgium.   
 
To support this argument, I will proceed to the following analysis. After a brief 
presentation of the socio-demographic profile of the Belgian emigrant population, I 
first proceed to a discussion on the creation of the two main Belgian emigrant 
associations to demonstrate how the tension between Flemings and Francophones was 
a crucial variable in the creation and development of these organizations. Second, I 
discuss the adoption of the two external voting laws to illustrate how the anticipated 
impact of emigrant voters has steered controversies on the territorial border between 
Flemish and French-speaking areas of Belgium. This situation, I argue, has 
contributed to further the distinction between Flemish and French-speaking Belgians 
abroad. Third, comparing the evolution of national legislative elections in 2003, 2007 
and 2010, I argue that the success of Flemish nationalist parties in Flanders has 
followed a similar pattern among Flemish voters abroad.  
 
In terms of methodology, this paper relied on extensive fieldwork conducted between 
2006 and 2011. It includes the analysis of the archives of the two main Belgian 
emigrant associations as well as semi-directed interviews with several of their leaders. 
With respect to the external voting debate, the analysis of the press and parliamentary 
minutes and the conduct of interviews with Belgian senators and MPs have shed light 
on the triangular connection between the external voting issue, the issue of the right to 
vote of foreigners residing in Belgium and the ethnic tension between Flemings and 
French-speakers. Finally, I analyse data of the Belgian Interior and Foreign Affairs 
ministries on the political participation of emigrants in the 2003, 2007 and 2011 
legislative elections and illustrate the impact of the ethnic tensions on the emigrants 
political opinions with different quotes selected from the 23 interviews conducted 
with Belgian emigrants in New York City in the period immediately preceding and 
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1. A socio-demographic description of contemporary Belgian emigration 
 
As underlined by Morelli (1998) in one of the few books that have touched upon this 
issue, emigration has been erased out of Belgian history. It appears that neither the 
Flemish nor the Walloon authorities find it relevant today to acknowledge the fact 
that, from the Belgian independence in 1830 until 1919, Belgium was facing more 
out-migration than in-migration. Nonetheless, the only official references to these old 
migration waves tend to glorify this past by referring to specific examples that are 
considered as “success stories” such as those of Walloons who migrated to Sweden or 
the Flemish who settled in South Africa. These examples obviously neglect the fact 
that the majority of Belgians who left the country during this period did so because 
they were forced to do so for socio-economic reasons (Petillon, 1998). The fact that 
around 500,000 Belgians were living in France in 1890 (working mainly in the textile 
industry) when the country only counted 6,000,000 inhabitants at the time is quite 
telling in this regard (Stengers, 1980). A similar malaise surrounds the history of the 
Belgian presence in the former colony of the Congo. Even though the Belgians had 
always considered Congo as a colony of exploitation rather than a colony of 
settlement, the authorities wanted white citizens to occupy key positions there. After a 
pro-active policy of the Belgian state to limit the influx of non-Belgian migrants into 
the colony, Belgian represented almost 80% of the 115,000 Whites living there on the 
eve of independence in 1960 (Foutry, 1998).  
 
Whether or not the lack of interest of Belgian authorities for the country’s emigration 
is caused by its difficulty to deal with some darker chapters of its history, Belgium 
has long lacked the proper tools to collect date on its population abroad. Indeed, the 
statistics of the Belgian National Statistical Institute (INS) relying on municipal 
population registries have long suffered from the practice of many emigrants of not 
declaring to their municipality that they are leaving the country. Yet, this limited data 
inform us that around 10,000 Belgians have left the country yearly since World War 
II and this figure had almost doubled at the turn of the 21st century. Out of these new 
Belgian emigrants population, a small majority were men (54.2%) and the modal age 
to leave Belgium is 26 years old. To our particular, interest, we observe large regional 
discrepancies in terms of migration decisions for the emigration rate reaches 11/1000 
in Brussels (a bilingual region that at least 70% francophone according to most 
conservative estimate), 5.7/1000 in Wallonia and 3.37/1000 in the most populated 
region that is Flanders. This data indicates that the Francophone population abroad 
has been growing faster than the Flemish one in the past years which, as we shall see, 
has had consequences on the perception of the emigrant population by political 
parties. 
 
To determine where Belgian emigrants move, we can make use of the registries that 
each Belgian consulate is obliged to hold since 2002. While this registration facilitates 
administrative contacts and is a condition to register as a voter from abroad, the 
registration at the consulate is not an obligation for citizens abroad. As shown in 
Figure 1, around half of the 316,703 Belgians registered abroad in 2008 were living 
one of the six following destination countries: the four neighbouring countries 
(Netherlands, Luxemburg, Germany and France), Spain and the United States. In 
order to understand the significance of the Belgian presence in the neighbouring 
countries, we should also mention that a non-quantifiable number of Belgians 
commute to work in one of these countries every day.  
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Source: SPF Affaires étrangères (2006) Statistieken bevolking 2006 - 01/07/2006 (not published). 
 
2. Belgian emigrants’ associations: Ethnicity as a factor of mobilization abroad 
 
Historically, Belgian migrants’ associations were quite common in countries like 
France, Canada, the United States and the former Belgian Congo. These associations  
were usually concerned with maintaining their Belgian identity abroad and with 
questions of integration into the host country. They were organized on a local or 
national basis in the country of residence and, until the 1960s, they had little 
transnational connections and no strong presence in the home country. Nonetheless, 
some of these associations such as the “Confédération des sociétés belges et franco-
belges de France” had sporadically addressed specific demands to Belgian authorities 
concerning the access of emigrants to social and political rights in Belgium.  
 
The creation of Belgïe in de Wereld (BIW, or Belgium in the World) in 1963 marked 
a turning point in the representation of Belgian emigrants in the home country. The 
roots of this association lay in the former Belgian Congo, Flemish migrants created 
two magazines in Flemish (Band in 1942 and Zuiderkruis in 1955) to respond to the 
absence of publication in that language in the colony. These magazines, run by 
Flemish intellectuals started a dynamic of affirmation of the Flemish identity abroad. 
The political implications of those magazines were important considering that key 
positions in the colony, and more generally, most positions of power in Belgium were 
occupied by French speakers. Since the 19th century, Belgium had indeed been a 
country ruled administratively, economically and politically in French with little 
consideration for the Flemish culture. French speakers in the Congo accordingly did 
not see the creation of these magazines with a positive eye.  
 
With the independence of the Congo in 1960 and the subsequent repatriation of 
thousands of Belgians, several founders of the two magazines decided to provide 
social and psychological support to the returnees. They subsequently set up their 
office in Brussels and expanded their goals to “the promotion of the social and 
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cultural interests of the Flemings spread all over the world and more precisely of 
those Flemings who have migrated abroad or who have returned to the home country, 
and on the other hand, helping to promote the Dutch culture in a broad sense” 
(translation mine, quoted in Goovaerts 1988: 8). After promoting the new associations 
extensively in different part of the world, they created the association België in de 
Wereld (Belgium in the World) in 1963.  
 
It may sound surprising that an association whose origins and activities were so 
closely linked to the Flemish dimension of Belgian emigration chose to name itself 
“Belgium in the world”. Indeed, one of the major complaint reported by a Arthur 
Verthé, founder of BIW, is that Belgium did not care for its emigrants: “We [the 
Flemings in Belgium] had no motherland and the Flemings abroad had no 
motherland. (…). They have migrated out of misery and Belgium has done nothing 
for them” (Interview, 1 December 2006). In the 1960s the Flemish emancipation 
movement in Belgium had indeed grown stronger and, in this respect, the aspiration 
of some Flemings emigrants (and former emigrants) to promote their Flemish instead 
if their Belgian identity abroad was following the demands of Flemish leaders in 
Belgium. Nonetheless, the association chose to call itself Belgium in the world 
because it would appear less suspicious to political leaders in Belgium but the goal of 
the association was to support emigrants as well as conduct a cultural and social 
action for the spreading of our culture in the whole world (Interview with Arthur 
Verthé, 1 December 2006 and (Goovaerts, 1988: 12). 
 
While BIW was originally open to all Belgian citizens, its strong emphasis on the 
Flemish culture and the attacks of the French-speaking press made it difficult for BIW 
to claim it could help all Belgians abroad. Therefore, the BIW leaders saw a solution 
in asking the French speakers to set up their own association. This assessment was 
clearly expressed by the president of the association:  
“From the start, “Belgie in de Wereld” has been faced with the same problems as our 
French-speaking compatriots of the diaspora. BIW is, in fact, the offspring of a 
Flemish cultural association which was formed in Congo, which grew into the 
widespread organization we know today, but which has remained primarily a Flemish 
initiative. Although we have not restricted our social work to Flemish communities 
but have placed all our resources at the disposal of the Walloons as well, we realise 
that as Flemings it is well-nigh impossible for us to satisfy the cultural and 
psychological needs of the Walloon emigrants” (Ambassadeur, 1968: 2). 
 
BIW’s cultural dimension quickly made it uncomfortable for the association to keep 
helping all Belgians abroad when they were constantly stressing the peculiarities of 
Flemings abroad. They thus decided to encourage the French speakers to set up their 
own association and, in 1967, Belgique dans le Monde (Belgium in the World) later 
renamed Union des Belges à l’étranger (UBE, or Union of Belgians Abroad) was 
born. Despite, the proximity of some UBE members to associations promoting the 
French language in Belgium, the francophone associations was less preoccupied with 
cultural and identity than its Flemish counterpart. Yet, it aimed primarily at 
representing the Belgians residing abroad before the public opinion and the Belgian 
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After the creation of UBE, the domestic political debate on the future of Belgium as a 
unitary state intensifies with the expulsion of Francophones from the Catholic 
University of Leuven in 1968 and the creation in 1970 of Linguistic communities 
whose authorities are granted prerogatives to conduct the cultural and education 
policies in place of the national government. As Belgium the institutional structure of 
Belgium is progressively granting more prerogatives to regional entities, BIW took a 
further step in the direction of stressing its Flemish identity when it changed its name 
to Vlamingen in de Wereld (VIW) in 1976.  Founders of the association justified the 
name change by the following argument:  
“In its first appellation, the association was named “Belgium in the World” and not 
“Belgians in the world”: “Belgium” is a concept that implies its cultural communities 
while “Belgian” is clearly not a concept related to culture. And now it is “Flemings in 
the World” and not “Flanders in the World”: because “Flanders” is a concept 
subjected to more historical and political interpretations, while the concept of 
“Flemish” describes our clearly our target: all the persons who due to their historical 
backgrounds or connections still bear their Flemish condition as it has grown from a 
millenary history” (Translation mineVIW Nieuws, 1977: 2). 
 
UBE reacted two years after by changing its name to Union Francophone des Belges 
à l’étranger (UFBE, or Francophone Union of Belgians Abroad). While it appears 
that the association’s members were reluctant to modify this name in a direction that 
would limit the scope of their intervention to a certain population, they changed it in 
order to be in phase with the institutional evolution of Belgium. As more prerogatives 
were given to the regional entities in Belgium, the association was indeed increasingly 
confronted to regional institutions for a variety of issues (e.g. issues of access of 
education of children of emigrants)(Les Belges à l'étranger, 1978: 2).  
 
Changing the name into Union francophone rather than Union des Belges 
francophones is significant. Indeed, the idea was to keep offering services to all 
Belgians –independently of their regions of origin- but using only the French 
language. For founding member of the association, Hugues du Roy de Blicquy, the 
inclusion of the term “francophone” in the association’s name was also a response to 
the demands of some politicians for greater emphasis on the francophone dimension 
of the association (Interview, 15 November 2006).  
 
Belgian political parties and institutions will indeed take a progressively greater role 
in the two associations both in their financing and in their composition. Today, VIW 
receives an annual grant from the Flemish Ministry of external relations that covers a 
large share of its budget. Also, the association’s priorities appear to have evolved 
through time. Historically, it was providing moral support to its members, allowing 
exchange of information and contributing to the diffusion of the Flemish culture 
abroad while not being active in Belgium. Today, the association has reshaped its 
priorities towards increasing its networking activities, helping Flemings who decide to 
leave Belgium, defending the interests of the Flemish emigrant as a group and 
promoting the role of Flemings abroad as an asset for the policies set up by the 
Flemish regional government.  
 
As far as UFBE is concerned, public authorities have also supported the association 
by seconding some workers or contributing to the payment of the salaries of some 
staff. Also, the four largest Francophone political parties have a representative in the 
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association’s Board of Directors. Despite the increased politicization of the 
association, UFBE remains primarily a service-oriented association that the French- 
provides its members support to solve different sorts of administrative issues that 
expatriates may face and that concern Belgian authorities or the authorities of the 
country of destination (e.g. pensions, education, administrative status, visas…). 
Another important mission of the association is the defence of the right of the 
expatriate community by lobbying authorities and political parties for reforms on 
issues such as dual nationality or external voting. In this lobby function on issues 
concerning all Belgians abroad, cooperation between VIW and UFBE takes place by, 
for instance, discussing emigrants’ issues difficulties the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
 
 
3. Enfranchising citizens abroad: The impact emigrants’ ethnicity on domestic 
politics 
 
The main obstacle to the political participation of Belgian citizens residing abroad has 
been the provision of the electoral law of 1831, which stipulates that one can only 
vote if he is a resident of a Belgian municipality. In order to find a solution to a 
Walloon-Flemish ethnic conflict in a municipality located along the border of the two 
regions, legislators amended this rule in 1988. While the Government also mentioned 
that this reform could pave the way for external voting, its main concern was not the 
political rights of Belgians abroad. Once this constitutional obstacle was solved, the 
remaining legal hurdle was to pass the necessary legislation organizing the vote 
abroad.  
 
As evidenced by the limited number of legislative proposals, there was little 
consensus among political parties regarding the need to allow Belgian emigrants to 
vote from abroad. Political parties in Belgium are not only divided along ideological 
lines, but also by language (Dutch and French). Within this complex political 
spectrum, only the French-speaking Liberals (PRL later called MR) repeatedly tabled 
legislative proposals in favour of external voting. This party’s activism was based on 
the belief that Belgians abroad would vote for them because they had a similar socio-
economic profile to liberal voters in Belgium (Interview with Daniel Ducarme, PRL 
MP, 30 November 2006). For similar reasons, both the French-speaking and Dutch-
speaking Socialist parties strongly opposed it for decades. It turned out that they 
supported the right for foreigners to vote in local Belgian elections also partly because 
they thought it would be beneficial to left-wing parties.  
 
While Liberals had long lacked the support of other parties to enable external voting 
legislation to pass, a change in Belgium’s domestic politics played in their favour. 
This change was strongly pushed by a supranational actor: the European Union. With 
the creation of European citizenship by the Maastricht treaty in 1991, EU member 
states decided to explicitly recognize passive and active electoral rights in EU and 
local elections to EU nationals residing in another Member State than their own. In 
Belgium, such a right could only be granted if Article 8 of the Constitution, which 
stipulates that one must be a Belgian citizen in order to vote in Belgium, was changed. 
However, revising the Constitution required a two-thirds majority in Parliament, 
which the governing parties at the time did not have. The reason for a lack of 
consensus was that some Flemish parties were concerned that most EU-citizens 
residing in the Flemish municipalities around Brussels would vote for French-
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speaking candidates, which would thus undermine the Flemish character of these 
towns. Furthermore, some parties also feared that the revision of the Constitution 
would open the door to larger reforms allowing third country nationals to vote in local 
elections. Instead of external voting, it is the question of non-citizens’ political rights 
that became salient in Belgian politics as early as the beginning of the 1980s (Jacobs, 
1998). 
 
The increased prominence of the issue of EU residents’ political rights also 
encouraged UFBE and VIW, to pressure Belgian authorities. They saw a window of 
opportunity and began to lobby Belgian political parties as a new Government formed 
in 1995. The associations’ central argument was that it would be unfair to give 
foreigners political rights in Belgium when, at the same time, Belgians abroad were 
denied the ability to exercise such rights from abroad.  
 
By 1998, the European pressure on Belgium became unbearable as the European 
Court of Justice found Belgium guilty of not complying with the obligation to allow 
EU citizens to vote in local elections. As Belgium is the host of several EU 
institutions and receives a large number of people from other EU Member States, this 
situation proved particularly uncomfortable for the Belgian government. One way for 
the governing parties to reach a two-thirds majority in Parliament was to convince 
parties outside of the governing coalition to vote in favour of the constitutional 
reform, which would allow EU residents to vote in local elections. The Catholic-
Socialist coalition government had therefore to turn to opposition parties and ask for 
their support on this specific issue. The choice was thus made to call on the French-
speaking Liberal Party (PRL) for help. A deal between the governing parties and the 
PRL sealed the common fate of Belgian emigrants’ and EU citizens’ political rights: a 
law allowing external voting was passed in exchange for their support of the revision 
of the Constitution. 
 
Though changes in domestic politics created by the EU are crucial in explaining why 
the legislation eventually passed, the legislation’s content is strongly determined by 
party competitions. The enfranchisement of new categories of voters (be they Belgian 
emigrants or EU and non-EU citizens residing in Belgium) necessarily leads to 
political parties’ speculation on the impact of these voters on electoral results. 
Because it was firmly convinced that it would benefit from this vote, the French-
speaking Liberal Party had traditionally supported the enfranchisement of emigrants. 
Other parties, and the French-speaking Socialist Party in particular, were on the 
contrary convinced that Belgians abroad could cost them seats and accordingly found 
ways to limit the impact of this emigrant vote. The restrictions contained in the 
December 18, 1998 law epitomize this situation as the extremely bureaucratic 
procedure put in place allowed only 18 electors to vote from abroad in the 1999 
legislative elections. The costly, restrictive and extremely bureaucratic procedures put 
in place outraged emigrant associations and the PRL. On the Left, supporters of a 
limited form of emigrant participation were quietly pleased with the limited impact of 
the external vote. 
 
The government formed after the 1999 elections included the Flemish and French 
speaking Socialists and Liberals, but not the Catholics. As they assumed power, new 
leaders from the French-speaking Liberals committed themselves to reform external 
voting to make it more inclusive. To facilitate the registration of voters abroad, a 
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consular registry has been created to identify more easily the voting population 
abroad before elections. Most importantly, the legislation on external voting was 
eventually modified by the law of 7 March 2002, which made it easier to vote from 
abroad by facilitating the registration procedure and giving emigrant the possibility to 
vote by mail, in person or by proxy. An essential point in this reform however is that 
emigrants would be able to choose the Belgian constituency in which they want to 
vote. In the registration form, they are indeed asked in which Belgian municipality 
they be would like to register as external voters. This, in turn, determines the 
constituency in which the emigrant will cast his vote (e.g. in the case of the Senate’s 
elections, it determines if the voter is attached to the Flemish, Walloon or Brussels 
constituency). The emigrants’ liberty in the registration process is controversial for 
two reasons. First, voting is mandatory in Belgium and the Council of State (i.e. The 
Supreme Administrative Court of Belgium) found in a non-binding opinion that 
leaving the liberty to emigrants to register or not as voters was a breach of the 
Constitution. Neither the Government nor Parliament tried to address this issue for 
they found it materially impossible to enforce the obligation abroad and some parties 
feared the impact mandatory voting abroad on electoral results.  
 
Second and most importantly, some Flemish politicians feared that the liberalization 
of the external voting regime would artificially increase the number of Francophone 
voters in the Flemish surroundings of Brussels. In the Brussels Region and some 
Flemish municipalities around it (where Francophones represent a large share of the 
population), voters have indeed the choice to vote for Flemish parties or Francophone 
parties. In the rest of the country, citizens do not have such option. The possibility to 
choose in the so-called Brussels-Hal-Vilvorde district is a major source of contention 
in Belgian politics. On the one hand, Flemish parties question the idea that one could 
live in Flanders while defining him/herself culturally and politically as a Francophone 
Belgian. For this reason, they argue that citizens living in Flanders should only able to 
vote for Flemish parties. On the other hand, Francophone parties defend the right for 
Francophone minorities in Flanders to vote for parties of their linguistic groups.  
 
With respect to emigrant voters, the issue is therefore partly symbolic because the 
potential influx of Francophone emigrants who register in those Flemish 
municipalities around Brussels would artificially increase the Francophone vote in the 
area. This increase in the Francophone vote in this are is also, and primarily, a 
strategic issue for Flemish parties who fear that the increase in the Francophone vote 
in this are where Flemish and Francophone parties compete could involve a loss of 
seats for Flemish parties in Parliament. For both of these reasons, some Flemish 
municipalities of the Bruxelles-Hal-Vilvorde constituency had decided to refuse to 
add the emigrant voters who fill their registration form in French. These emigrants 
have therefore been prevented from voting in the 2003 elections. 
 
During the parliamentary debates on the reform of the external voting legislation after 
the 2003 elections, MP Vanpoucke from the Flemish Christian-Democratic Party 
(CD&V) summed up the concern of some Flemish politicians on the impact of 
Francophone external voters:  
 
“ (…) the right to vote for Belgians abroad is a demand of the Francophones. The 
strict modalities of the 18th December 1998 Law did not satisfy the Francophone 
political parties. This is why this project, which is one more concession of [Prime 
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Minister] Verhofstad to the French speakers, is presented under the pretext that all 
Belgians who qualify as voters should be able to exercise their right. No democrat can 
indeed argue against this principle. This [extension of the] right to vote will 
principally create new French-speaking voters. Obviously, this is interesting in the 
Brussels-Hal-Vilvorde constituency because Francophone and Flemish parties 
compete with each other there”(1). 
 
After the 2003 elections, accusations of instrumentalization of the external voting 
legislation to increase the Francophone vote in the disputed Brussels constituency are 
repeated by the Flemish nationalist and xenophobic party Vlaams Belang who 
consider that “it is proven that the [emigrants’] possibility to chose a Belgian 
municipality without restriction has been abused to influence electoral results. The 
Belgians residing abroad who have registered in the Bruxelles-Hal-Vilvorde 
constituency, have voted in majority in favour of Francophone political parties 
(…)”(2). To this end, they introduced a law proposal that aimed at obliging emigrants 
to register as voters in their last municipality of residence in Belgium. As I shall 
demonstrate below, the registration data in the Bruxelles-Hal-Vilvorde constituency 
provides no proof of a French-speaking “grand strategy” to increase artificially  the 
presence of French speakers in this disputed constituency. Yet, the Vlaams Belang 
was more concerned with the symbolic impact of the influx of Francophone vote 
rather than its impact on the distribution of seats. As argued by MP Bart Laeremans 
during the interview, any increase of the French-speaking presence in the Flemish 
municipalities around Brussels is a threat to the Flemish character of these places 
(Interview, 23 November 2006). 
 
Another development that followed the 2003 elections was the proposal made by 
some French-speaking Liberal MPs to extend external voting to regional elections. In 
a non-binding opinion on the constitutional character of this law proposal, the Council 
of State took the opportunity to criticize the possibility given to emigrants voters to 
vote chose the municipality where they want to register. It indeed found 
discriminatory that emigrants be given a choice other voters don’t have and 
considered that “[i]n extreme situations, it could also be envisaged that registration be 
dictated (…) by the sole desire to modify the electoral equilibrium”. In considering 
the extension of external voting to regional elections, the Council found this choice 
even less acceptable because in the election of the Brussels Regional Council, 
Flemish voters represent a minority that could be further diluted with the influx of 
Francophone emigrant voters (Opinion 36.229/2, Council of State). Stressing the 
theoretical possibility that emigrants use their liberty to register as voters wherever 
they want to purposefully influence equilibrium between Flemings and Francophone 
in Brussels, the Court was thus legitimizing the fears expressed by Flemish political 
parties. While none of the above-mentioned mentioned reforms passed, the Flemish 
concerns for manipulation were taken seriously. The Government eventually 
suggested that registration from abroad could only be made using the official 
language of the municipality where the emigrant wishes to register. Naturally, while 
this prevented Francophone emigrants to register in the disputed Flemish 
municipalities around in French, it could not prevent them from doing so in Dutch. 
 
For several decades, the tension between Flemings and Francophones has occupied a 
growing place in Belgian politics to the point that most issues that are dealt by the 
Federal government today are inspected through the ethnic lens. In other words, most 
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political decisions are evaluated in terms of their respective impact on these two 
different populations. With the progressive reforms of the State, political parties, 
which for several decades are separated along linguistic lines in addition to 
ideological lines, have become increasingly concerned with the regional impact of 
decisions taken at the national level. The above discussion on the controversies 
surrounding the adoption of the external voting legislation confirms this trend. 
 
I demonstrated that the anticipated impact of external voters is decisive in the 
adoption and the content of legislation. In the case of Belgium, the impact of external 
voters is two fold. First, external voters may modify electoral results by voting for a 
particular party in greater proportion than resident voters. The Francophone Liberal 
Party bet on this possibility and accordingly seized the opportunity to bargain for the 
adoption of such legislation when governing parties asked for its support for the 
constitutional reform. Second, and most importantly, external voters may theoretically 
modify the electoral equilibrium between Flemish and Francophone in the Brussels-
Hal-Vilvorde constituency (which is the only one where they still compete against 
one another).  
 
The recurring Flemish concern about a possible instrumentalization of external voting 
to increase the Francophone vote in this constituency is monopolizing the debate on 
external voting. Its most acute demonstration led to the exclusion from the voters’ list 
of the emigrants who had tried to register with a French form in some Flemish 
municipalities. This concern however relies on two assumptions that are not 
supported by any data. First, there are no indications that Francophone Belgians 
abroad are a cohesive group that could be instrumentalized at the time of choosing 
where to register as voters. Despite its concentration in a limited number of 
destination countries, the absence of concentration in ethnic neighbourhoods abroad 
and the weak level of organizations abroad of Francophone and Flemish migrants 
alike do not favour their instrumentalization. Second, the use of external voting to 
influence the Flemish-Francophone conflict around Brussels supposes that emigrant 
voters consider the ethnic issue as their prime motivation to register as voters. As I 
shall demonstrate in the next section, electoral results abroad do not indicate that this 
issue occupies a smaller or greater place for emigrant voters compared to domestic 
voters. Accordingly, I argue that, despite the lack of hard data indicating elements of 
instrumentalization of the Belgian population abroad, fearful Flemish parties and the 
Council of State have raised concerns on the consequences of external voting on the 
Flemish-Francophone conflict because of the prevalence of this issue in contemporary 





4. Voting from abroad: The relevance of ethnic issues for emigrant voters 
 
In the first two sections of the article, I first discussed how the Flemish cultural and 
political emancipation movement stimulated the creation of emigrant associations 
abroad and showed that it was an elite-driven process following closely the 
institutional evolution (i.e. regionalisation) of the country. Then, I demonstrated how 
the tension between Flemings and Francophone, particularly in the surroundings of 
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Brussels, have conducted Flemish political parties but also the Council of State to 
look at the enfranchisement of citizens abroad with suspicion. 
 
In the last part of this paper, I examine how the emigrants themselves react to the 
regional conflict opposing Flemish and Francophone political parties in Belgium. The 
absence of research on this population means that very little data is available on 
Belgians abroad. Nonetheless, different stereotypes have developed in Belgium on to 
the political orientation of this population. With respect to their political party 
preference, the Francophone Liberals have historically defended the idea that 
emigrants had a similar socio-political profile to that of their electorate despite the 
lack of empirical evidence. Concerning the attitude of emigrants towards the 
increasing tension between Flemings and Francophones, two opposite interpretations 
co-exist. On the one hand, Flemish political parties are convinced that Francophone 
emigrants could mobilize to register in Flemish municipalities around Brussels (or be 
instrumentalized by political parties to do) to increase the francophone vote in this 
disputed area. On the other hand, the Belgian media has traditionally promoted an 
image of Belgian abroad being more attached to Belgium as a unitary state and less 
interested in regional autonomy than Belgians who have not left the country. 
 
To shed light on the positioning of Belgians abroad (both Flemings and 
Francophones) on the regional conflict and how it affects their voting behaviour, I 
suggest to look at the registration data and electoral results abroad of the 2003, 2007 
and 2010 Federal legislative elections. First, by looking at the registration data, we 
can determine if there is a mobilization of Francophone voters to vote in the disputed 
area in order to influence the electoral equilibrium. Second, in the analysis of 
elections abroad, we can measure the importance of the regional issue by looking at 
the result of the Flemish nationalist parties. 
 
 
The registration behaviour of emigrant voters 
 
As the 1999 election revealed a fiasco in terms of participation from abroad, the 
government was eager to make it a success, at least at the administrative level, in 
2003. To encourage Belgians abroad to register, consulates and embassies launched 
an information campaign by mailing invitations to vote that emigrants just had to 
return or by publishing advertisement in UFBE’s newsletter (Le journal des Belges à 
l’étranger 2003a). UFBE and VIW too encouraged emigrants to participate by 
inviting them to send their form back to the administration and the former even gave 
political parties column inches to present their electoral program. 
 
Out of the 215,701 Belgians residing abroad who were listed in the consular registry 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who were considered as potential voters, 114,620 
eventually sent the voter’s registration form to the administration for the 2003 
elections. Bearing in mind that voting is an obligation for the emigrants listed in the 
consular registry, it means that more than 100,000 did not comply with their 
obligation to vote.  
 
Looking at the regional distribution compiled from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
data, 37.2% of the registered voters chose to register with a municipality belonging to 
a Flemish province, 37.8% chose to register with a municipality belonging to a 
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Walloon province and 25% registered in the Brussels-Hal-Vilvorde district. The fact 
that an equal number of Flemish and Walloon emigrants take part in the election 
confirms the idea that Francophones are over-represented in the emigrant population. 
Yet, contrarily to the fear of some Flemish politicians, Francophone emigrants did not 
massively register in Flemish municipalities of the Bruxelles-Hal-Vilvorde 
constituency. Indeed, only 3% of the total of Flemish and Francophone emigrant 
voters have registered in the disputed Flemish municipalities around Brussels. This is 
by no mean sufficient to indicate a strong desire of Francophone emigrants to take 
advantage of their liberty with regard to the municipality of registration in 2003.  
 
Indeed, in the semi-directed interviews with emigrants and the informal interviews 
conducted during my own observation of the electoral process in Mexico City in 2007 
and in New York in 2010, emigrants systematically mentioned one of these three 
elements to justify the municipality where they chose to register: place of birth, place 
last place of residence or the place where the emigrants’ family is living.   
 
The data of the 2007 show no substantial change with the 2003 elections. First, a total 
of 121,817 emigrants registered to vote (+ 7,197 in comparison with 2003). Second, 
the obligation to register in the official language of the municipality did not modify 
substantially the registration patter in the Bruxelles-Hal-Vilvorde constituency where 
24% (-1%) of the Belgian emigrants voted. Third, the list of countries where most 
Belgian emigrants participated remained stable between 2003 and 2011 (France, 
Germany, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Spain, the United States, Switzerland, the 
United Kingdom, Canada and Italy). 
 
In 2010, on the contrary, the registration data have changed dramatically due to the 
fact that these elections were anticipated after the dissolution of the Parliament. The 
anticipated elections were caused by the crisis between Flemish and Francophone 
governing parties after they failed to reform of the Bruxelles-Hal-Vilvorde 
constituency. In case of anticipated elections, the Ministry of the Interior only has 
forty days to organize the elections. Abroad, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had thus 
to work on the short schedule to inform emigrants and process their registration 
forms. The result is that only 42,489 emigrants managed to register for the 2010 
election. In addition, the Flemish Regional Minister for the Interior subsequently 
erased from the voters’ registry the emigrants who had registered in French in the 
disputed municipalities around Brussels. This last element confirms that, despite the 
fact that the date shows the absence of concerted action by Francophone emigrants to 
register in these municipalities, Francophone emigrants wishing to vote there remain 
suspicious. In this sense, emigrants are affected by the importance that these 
municipalities have on the domestic political scene: to establish the Flemish character 
of these towns, ought to be kept out of the electoral lists. 
 
 
The electoral preferences of emigrant voters 
 
Presenting the results of the votes cast abroad involves two difficulties in the Belgian 
system. First, it is only possible to isolate the votes of those emigrants who voted in 
person or by proxy in an embassy or in a consulate. These votes are counted by the 
special counting stations set up by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (which 
subsequently sends the results to the head counting station of each electoral college). 
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On the contrary, the emigrants who choose to vote by mail or in person or by proxy in 
Belgium see their votes mixed with those of domestic voters before the count. 
Accordingly, the results I’m presenting here represent around 14% of the total of the 
votes cast by emigrants. The second difficulty concerns the fact that legislative 
elections involve in reality to cast two votes on Election day –one for the House and 
one for the Senate- and the constituencies for these two election do not coincide. I 
choose to present the result of the senatorial elections because the three constituencies 
roughly coincide with the geographic borders of the three regions (Flanders, Wallonia 
and Brussels). I shall thus present the results of the emigrant votes cast in the Flemish 
and Walloon constituency where Flemish and Francophone parties do not compete 
with one another. Doing so, we can compare the electoral preferences of Flemish and 
Walloon emigrant voters with those of domestic voters.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1&2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Looking at table 1 and 2, the first striking element is the confirmation of the 
Francophone liberal party’s intuition that the electorate abroad would be favourable to 
them. During the interview, the head of the International Section of MR, Daniel 
Ducarme, explained the over-representation of Liberal Party voters among expatriates 
as such “[y]ou need to have a special psychological background to leave your 
country. Expatriates have a Liberal mindset that is the mentality of risk-takers” 
(Interview 30 November 2006). My interviews with Belgian emigrants in New York 
indeed confirmed the recurrence of the idea of looking for new professional 
challenges as a motivation for departure. While the causal link between having a risk-
taking mentality and the vote for Liberal parties remains unclear, the Francophone 
MR and the Flemish VLD have both gathered at least 4% more votes abroad than at 
home in the three elections. The Flemish and Francophone Socialist parties, on the 
contrary, have systematically gathered a significantly smaller share of the votes 
abroad than at home. 
 
Another notable data concerns the Flemish (GROEN) and Francophone (ECOLO) 
Green parties that are systematically performing better abroad than at home (even 
doing twice as good abroad in 2003). While we miss data on voters abroad to explain 
this phenomenon, Marie Nagy, MP for the Francophone Greens argues that citizens 
abroad are confused the name changes of Belgian political parties over the past 
decade. The Green parties, on the contrary, have gained international exposure with 
the growing importance of the climate change issue and offer a label that is 
understandable by all citizens wherever they are (Interview, 30 November 2006). 
 
I have argued that two different interpretations co-exist in Belgium with respect to the 
emigrants’ position on the ethnic conflict. On the one hand, the concern of some 
Flemish parties about the instrumentalization of the emigrant vote around Brussels 
supported the idea that emigrant voters are influenced by the ethnic conflict in their 
electoral behaviour. The registration data does not however support this view. On the 
one hand, the Belgian media depicts an image of Belgians abroad being attached to 
the unitary form of the state and insensible to the demands of more regional autonomy 
defended by some parties.  
 
Looking at the success of Flemish nationalist parties abroad, this assessment must 
also be reconsidered. Indeed, in 2003 and 2007, Flemish nationalist and extreme-right 
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party Vlaams Blok has gathered over 15% of the Flemish emigrant votes (slightly less 
than its domestic result at home). The systematic xenophobic, anti-Belgium and anti-
EU discourse of this party leaves no doubt that the emigrants voting for this party are 
not fitting the image depicted by the media.  However, since the Vlaams Blok has 
progressively gained a status of legitimate political actor in the Flemish political 
arena, it is less surprising that, just like voters residing in Belgium, emigrant voters 
may be attracted to this party.  
 
In 2010, the success of nationalist ideas among Flemish emigrant is even more blatant 
looking at the 26% of the emigrant votes obtained by the New Flemish Alliance (N-
VA). This party does not offer the same xenophobic discourse than the Vlaams 
Belang, but however wishes to establish an independent Flemish republic. Together, 
these two parties took one out of three Flemish votes cast abroad in 2010. 
Nonetheless, this data does not allow to conclude that Flemings abroad would be 
more or less nationalistic than those who reside in Belgium.  What we can observe, on 
the contrary, is that the evolution of nationalist ideas among emigrant voters clearly 
follows its evolution on the national territory. Being a marginal and little know 
political party in 2003, the N-VA had performed poorly both at home and abroad. 
After it won the 2007 election on a joint list with the Christian-Democratic party, the 
party gained a notoriety that gave it enough confidence to present itself alone in 2010. 
In a context of strong tension between Flemings and Francophones, the nationalist 
hard-line defended by the N-VA took a bite at the Vlaams Belang electorate and 
became the biggest Flemish political party at home and abroad.  
 
Conclusion: The parallel evolution of public opinion among Belgians at home 
and abroad 
 
I began the article wondering how Belgians abroad are affected by the political 
tensions between Flemish and Francophone political parties that have been growing 
for the past 50 years and culminated after the 2010 elections in the impossibility to 
form a government for a year. Responses to this query have traditionally been based 
on weak empirical data that led to two very different hypotheses. The first one, 
developed by the Belgian media, describes the emigrants as unaffected by regional 
issues and supposes that they are more attached to the unitary state than non-
emigrants. The second one, developed by Flemish political parties, supposes that 
emigrants are closely following the political situation in Belgium and are willing to 
take sides for their region of origin from abroad (e.g. by registering as voters in a 
municipality where there vote can have the biggest impact). To verify these two 
hypothesis, I undertook the task of looking at the relation between the ethnic conflict 
in Belgium and the political participation of citizens abroad in three decisive 
moments. 
 
First, looking at the creation of Belgian emigrant associations abroad, I have 
demonstrated how the first significant emigrant association –Belgium in the World- 
was connected to Flemish political and cultural emancipation movement in Belgium. 
Insisting on the specific cultural needs of the Flemings neglected by a Francophone 
elite at home, this association was indeed contributing to the creation and preservation 
of a Flemish identity abroad. The division of this association in two different 
associations (Flemish and Francophone) followed the institutional evolution of the 
country. This evolution also responded to the demands of political parties who saw in 
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these associations a way of a making subnational identities exist at the international 
level. In this sense, the ethnic conflict has acted as a structuring factor for the 
emigrant community. This creation and evolution process of these associations is 
however largely an elite-driven process supported by a handful emigrant leaders and 
Belgian politicians.  
 
In the second part of the paper, I look at the relevance of the ethnic conflict in the 
debate on the enfranchisement of Belgians abroad. When this debate took place at the 
end of the 1990s and early 2000s, the Belgian political context has dramatically 
changed compared to the creation of the emigrant associations in the 1960s. With the 
regionalisation of the state, political parties are now primarily concerned with the 
consequences of any political decision on the linguistic group to which they belong. 
The use of this “ethnic lens” in the external voting debate creates important 
controversies on the possibility for Francophone emigrants to register in Flemish 
municipalities to symbolically increase the Francophone presence in this disputed 
area. This controversy took place without any indication that emigrants could act as a 
cohesive group that could mobilize on an ethnic basis. As the emigrant themselves 
were particularly quiet in the debate on their enfranchisement, this episode confirmed 
that political parties were projecting the home conflict abroad by suspecting the 
instrumentalization of Francophone emigrant voters. 
 
The third part of the paper demonstrates that this suspicion is largely unfounded as 
there has not been any concerted effort by Francophone voters abroad to register in 
strategic municipalities. Yet, the analysis of electoral results does not support either 
the hypothesis that Belgians abroad would be less nationalistic and more attached to 
unitary Belgium than domestic voters. What it shows, on the contrary, is that the 
support of Flemish voters for nationalist parties have increased simultaneously at 
home and abroad. For this reason, I conclude that the political opinions of Belgians 
abroad on the future of the country are strongly connected with political opinions of 
Belgians residing in their home country. In this respect the ethnic character of their 
representative associations and the ethnic lens that political parties have applied to the 
population abroad seem to have had little impact on Belgian emigrants. On the 
contrary, the easy accessibility to Belgian press from abroad and the connections with 
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